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Abstract
The recent surge in acts of maritime piracy in the waters off the Horn of Africa stands in sharp
contrast to a steep decline of such acts in Southeast Asia. In this study, we compare the development
of the problem of piracy in both Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. We find that four main
elements contributed to the recent decline in piracy in Southeast Asia: U.S. hegemonic interests,
existing and emergent international institutions, bilateral relations among regional actors, and the
density of naval forces in the region. Unfortunately, not all of these conditions are present in the Horn
of Africa. Thus, the problem of piracy in that region will require new and innovative solutions.
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Fighting Piracy: Experiences in Southeast 
Asia and off the Horn of Africa
Dr. Robert M. Farley, Ph.D.
Dr. Yoav Gortzak, Ph.D.
Overview
The recent surge in acts of maritime piracy in the waters off the Horn of 
Africa stands in sharp contrast to a steep decline of such acts in Southeast 
Asia. In this study, we compare the development of the problem of piracy 
in both Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa. We find that four main ele-
ments contributed to the recent decline in piracy in Southeast Asia: U.S. 
hegemonic interests, existing and emergent international institutions, 
bilateral relations among regional actors, and the density of naval forces 
in the region. Unfortunately, not all of these conditions are present in the 
Horn of Africa. Thus, the problem of piracy in that region will require new 
and innovative solutions.
Introduction
Over the course of 2008, Somali pirates, often operating from so-called 
"motherships," have engaged in increasingly frequent and brazen acts of 
piracy. These illicit actions have ranged from the capture and ransoming 
of luxury yachts to the hijacking of freight ships and supertankers.1 This 
recent spike in maritime piracy in the waters around East Africa has been 
so severe that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) recently 
adopted Resolution 1816 (2008), calling upon interested states to 
"increase and coordinate their efforts to deter acts of piracy and armed 
robbery at sea," which the UN considers a grave threat to the safe delivery 
of humanitarian assistance and maritime commerce in the region.2
The recent surge in piracy around the Horn of Africa bears a striking 
resemblance to the resurgence of the phenomenon that took place in the 
waters of Southeast Asia in the first half of this decade, which was simi-
larly precipitated by regional economic depression and weak local govern-
mental enforcement capabilities.3 After an initial surge in piratical 
activity in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea at the dawn of 
this century, however, the region has since witnessed its dramatic decline. 
Between 2004 and 2007, piratical acts in Southeast Asia declined by 
approximately 50 percent.4
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This paper will examine the reasons behind the decline of piracy in South-
east Asia in an effort to identify potential solutions to the rising problem 
of piracy off the Horn of Africa. In doing so, we argue that despite the fact 
that piracy in both regions appears to be driven by similar factors, the 
conditions that helped alleviate the problem in Southeast Asia in recent 
years are not currently present in the Horn of Africa.
The remainder of this article is organized in four sections. The first sec-
tion will briefly outline the problem of modern maritime piracy, its 
causes, and the potential threats the phenomenon poses to international 
security, governance, and commerce. The second section examines the 
factors that led to the resurgence and decline of the problem in the previ-
ously piracy-infested waters of Southeast Asia at the beginning of the 
decade, focusing especially on the role of the United States in this process. 
In doing so, it is possible to derive a number of potential lessons for those 
confronted with the phenomenon in other areas of the world. The third 
section of the paper shows that the conditions for a successful anti-piracy 
campaign around the Horn of Africa do not exist at the present time. In 
the final and concluding part of the paper we outline a number of poten-
tial solutions to the problem and weigh their relative merits and the likeli-
hood of their adoption.
The Problem of Maritime Piracy
Maritime piracy is not a new phenomenon in the international system.5 
During the Cold War, however, the problem of piracy was seldom viewed 
as significant. Compared to the superpower struggle for international pri-
macy, maritime piracy appeared to be a trivial issue. Over the past decade, 
however, observers have increasingly recognized that piracy, while cer-
tainly not an existential threat to the global economic system, can pose 
significant challenges to international order and stability.6
Clearly, piracy poses a potential threat to international trade, 80 percent 
of which involves ocean transit. While the contemporary problem of 
piracy has yet to reach levels significant enough to directly threaten free-
dom of movement of cargo on the world's oceans, as it sometimes did in 
previous centuries, it has already on occasion caused significant increases 
in insurance premiums for those engaged in maritime trade, in addition 
to direct losses from hijacked and stolen goods.7 Although the threat to 
maritime trade is most acute in strategically important passageways such 
as the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea—through which a large 
percentage of the world's trade passes—it can be felt anywhere.8 For 
instance, the attack on the oil tanker M/V Limburg in October 2002 
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caused a 300 percent increase in insurance premiums for Yemeni ship-
pers and reduced Yemeni port shipping volumes by 50 percent.9 As such, 
maritime piracy has the potential to become a serious nuisance in an era 
of increasing globalization.
A resurgence of maritime piracy raises concerns beyond the direct threat 
to international trade, however. Terrorist organizations may adopt meth-
ods used by, or ally themselves with, pirates to strike at the economic 
order that nations seek to promote and pursue. Regular attacks on ship-
ping, combined with spectacular attacks on key ports (such as Singapore), 
could significantly increase the costs of international maritime commerce 
and could undermine international stability. As the rise of container ship-
ping and on-demand production has made international commerce much 
more dependent on reliable timing and shipping schedules, a serious 
attack against one of the world's most strategic commercial routes or 
ports could have devastating effects on the international economy.10 
Moreover, the decreasing number of "hub ports," able to accommodate 
increasingly large container ships, makes the international economy even 
more vulnerable to such attacks.11
It is also worth noting that terrorist organizations might not limit them-
selves to attacks against important economic interests of the United 
States and its allies. Terrorists could seek to hijack cargo ships in order to 
obtain various types of weapons and explosives. They could also use the 
medium of maritime piracy to strike directly at the United States and its 
allies in an effort to perpetrate a major, high profile terrorist attack by 
hijacking cargo ships and using them to inflict damage on harbors and/or 
major population centers. By attacking or hijacking ships en route, terror-
ists could overcome the enhanced security measures that have been put in 
place to improve control over cargo containers destined for U.S. ports. In 
recent years, pirates have hijacked a number of large cargo ships in 
Southeast Asia. While authorities ultimately located some of these ves-
sels, others have disappeared completely. Terrorists will also have oppor-
tunities to hijack ships for their own purposes without being detected.12 
Some observers have singled out the relatively weak security arrange-
ments that characterize the transport of radioactive materials to and from 
Japan.13 If such a shipment were to fall into the wrong hands, it could 
provide the material for a "dirty bomb," which could be set off in a busy 
American port. Concerns about the use of ships to attack American ports 
have been voiced repeatedly since the attacks of September 11th, 2001.14
More important, perhaps, is the fact that terrorist organizations may 
make use of the logistical support that transnational piracy networks can 
provide. Terrorists "are prepared to do business with criminals who have 
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specific goods or skills they need, such as forged documents, or services 
that can expedite their operations, such as smuggling networks that can 
infiltrate operatives into specific destinations."15 Terrorist organizations 
themselves, moreover, could turn to piracy themselves in order to mobi-
lize resources for their fight against their enemies. Certainly, terrorist 
organizations have turned to organized crime on land in order to fund 
their activities, and there is good reason to believe that they would resort 
to sea-based crime in order to do so.
While pirates and terrorist organizations may have different aims, inde-
pendently and together they can threaten the free market economic sys-
tem that the United States and other nations seek to maintain.16 The 
actions of pirates increase the overall costs of international commerce. 
Terrorists likewise pose a maritime threat to the U.S.-led international 
economic order, and may pose a more direct threat to the security of their 
western enemies. In recognition of these threats, the National Strategy for 
Maritime Security, developed by the current American administration, 
states that "[the] safety and economic security of the United States 
depend in substantial part upon the secure use of the world's oceans… 
maritime security must be a top priority."17
Finally, failure to deal in a coordinated fashion with maritime piracy may 
lead to power vacuums in regions affected by the phenomenon, with 
potentially detrimental consequences for regional order. Both Japan and 
India, for instance, have shown interest in taking an active role in sup-
pressing piracy in the Malacca Straits and the Indonesian archipelago. 
Other regional actors have met these efforts with suspicion.18 Thus, the 
problem of piracy, while not a major direct threat to international order 
and stability, may have important secondary and unintended conse-
quences. By drawing in regional powers, the problem of piracy may spur 
or exacerbate regional rivalries and the rise of regional security dilemmas. 
As such, individual acts of piracy may cause little harm or impose only 
negligible economic costs on the powerful states in the system, but they 
may have more powerful political consequences than may appear to be 
the case at first blush.19
In sum, therefore, while the problem of maritime piracy is not an existen-
tial threat to any of the world's major powers, or to the international sys-
tem itself, it generates three major concerns. First, it can make maritime 
commerce more difficult and expensive to conduct. Second, pirates may 
ally themselves with politically-motivated terrorist groups that seek to 
harm the interests of the U.S. and its allies. Finally, the lawlessness asso-
ciated with piracy may lead regional powers to undertake efforts to 
repress the phenomenon, thereby triggering unwanted and potentially 
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destabilizing regional rivalries. All three problems associated with con-
temporary piracy are present around the Horn of Africa and as such the 
maritime powers in the international system would do well to make 
efforts to curb the phenomenon in the region.
A Blueprint for Success? The Rise and Decline of 
Piracy in Southeast Asia
The turn of the century witnessed the emergence of a troubling trend in 
Southeast Asia. Whereas the International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
had recorded a total of 1,587 acts of piracy in the fifteen years between 
1984 and 1999, the four-year period between 2000 and 2003 alone wit-
nessed 1,676 such acts.20 Much of this phenomenon was driven by the 
Asian financial crisis, which not only created incentives for local fisher-
men and criminals to turn to piratical activities, but also limited the 
capacity of local states to build up the forces required to enforce law and 
order in their territorial waters and beyond.21 At the same time, techno-
logical developments lowered the bar for those wishing to enter the piracy 
"business." Small arms, fast boats, and navigational devices, all necessary 
tools of the trade, have become accessible to an ever-growing number of 
people.
Initially, it appeared that there was little hope that piracy would subside 
in the region. Local anti-piracy efforts proved inadequate to contain the 
problem due to a lack of political will, regional jealousies, and paucity of 
resources.22 Part of the problem was asymmetry of interests. While for 
Singapore the threat of piracy was paramount, given its reliance on for-
eign trade, neither Malaysia nor Indonesia was overly concerned about 
the issue. Instead, they defined their maritime interests primarily through 
issues such as smuggling, illegal fishing, and illegal immigration. As a 
result, neither Malaysia nor Indonesia expressed much interest in invest-
ing scarce resources in the fight against piracy. Also, neither state feared 
the piracy/terrorism nexus as much as Singapore did. In fact, both 
Malaysia and Indonesia were more concerned with maintaining their sov-
ereignty and claims of authority over the Malacca Straits than with eradi-
cating piracy.23
Finally, while Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia ultimately did step up 
their cooperation in an effort to respond to the rise in maritime piracy, 
their efforts were hampered by operational constraints.24 As Young and 
Valencia noted in 2004:
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Indigenous Southeast Asian enforcement capacity is generally 
insufficient, although Malaysia has increased its enforcement 
effectiveness in recent years. Air surveillance and pursuit would 
be an important adjunct, but most Southeast Asian nations, and 
particularly Indonesia, cannot afford the number of aircraft nec-
essary to adequately patrol their vast coastal region.25
The most powerful maritime nation in the region (and the world, for that 
matter), the U.S., also did not want to intervene directly for a variety of 
reasons, not the least of which was regional resistance to an overt 
American role.
Despite these initial setbacks, by 2008 piracy was clearly on the decline in 
the region. Since 2004, piratical activity in Southeast Asia has declined 
each year. Whereas in that year 170 cases of piracy were reported in the 
region, last year saw this number drop to 78, a 50 percent decrease.26 So 
what accounts for this drastic decline? Although it is difficult to pinpoint a 
single cause, and one should be cautious about reading too much into this 
relatively short trend, a number of contributing factors seem to be at play 
in reducing the incidence of piracy, especially in the Straits of Malacca. 
One factor, in particular, seems to have been decisive: the role of external 
powers, such as the U.S. and Japan in boosting naval capabilities, resolve, 
and regional cooperation.
While the U.S. has played a key role in the repression of piracy in South-
east Asia in recent years, it has not played the traditional role of the hege-
monic maritime power. In contrast to its hegemonic predecessors, such as 
Great Britain and even the Roman Empire, the U.S. did not take upon 
itself to provide for system-wide maritime security and the protection of 
the world's sea lanes.27 In fact, the resurgence of piracy in Southeast Asia 
at the end of the 1990's did not prompt an immediate or vigorous 
American response. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, American policymakers 
were reluctant to embark on a potentially costly counter-piracy campaign. 
This was partly due to the fact that while the costs associated with mari-
time piracy rose they did not reach such levels as to significantly under-
mine international maritime commerce.28 Moreover, the costs of piracy 
were largely borne by non-American owners of the affected vessels. In the 
absence of strong domestic public pressure and powerful parochial inter-
est groups pushing for an active anti-piracy role for the U.S. government, 
U.S. policymakers had few incentives to undertake costly anti-piracy mea-
sures. The U.S. Navy, moreover, was not prepared to take on an anti-
piracy role. Spurred by both material limitations and institutional inter-
ests, the U.S. Navy chose to focus instead on its traditional role of prepar-
ing for naval warfare with great power competitors and as the provider of 
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expeditionary power projection capabilities.29 Altogether, it is not sur-
prising that before 9/11 the problem of piracy was considered to "merit 
U.S. participation in regional seminars on the issue," but no direct and 
costly action.30 This was especially true for the incoming administration 
of President George Bush in early 2001. After all, President Bush had 
actively campaigned for a more modest U.S. role in international affairs.
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, however, American policymakers 
increasingly recognized the threat posed by piracy, especially in combina-
tion with maritime terrorism. Yet, despite the recognition for the need for 
maritime security and the decreasing domestic constraints on its ability to 
act, the Bush administration did not choose to pursue a vigorous anti-
piracy campaign in Southeast Asia. In part, this passivity can be attrib-
uted to the fact that maritime piracy and/or terrorism have yet to make a 
significant impact upon the American public's consciousness and to the 
aforementioned absence of a strong constituency pushing the administra-
tion to take more vigorous action.
While there has been no strong domestic U.S. pressure to take direct 
action against the resurgence of piracy, international constraints have 
worked against direct American action against maritime piracy in South-
east Asia. The concept of sovereignty—the bedrock of the contemporary 
international system—formed and forms a serious stumbling block to the 
pro-active pursuit of an effective anti-piracy campaign by the United 
States. As Robert Beckman points out:
Under international law, no state has a right to exercise police 
power in an area under the territorial sovereignty of another 
state. The only exception would be if the coastal state expressly 
authorizes patrol craft or warships of another state to exercise 
police power in its territorial sea or archipelagic waters.31
The definition of piracy as an act perpetrated on the high seas and the 
concomitant restricted conditions under which states are free to act 
against it, have serious implications for the fight against maritime piracy 
in the Malacca Straits and other sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in 
close proximity to territorial waters of coastal states.
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore each claim at least part of the 
Malacca Straits as their territorial waters. As a result, many acts of rob-
bery and violence against ships in the Straits do not fall under the strict 
definition of piracy. Responding to such acts is the responsibility of the 
states in question. Almost any military or law enforcement action within 
the straits, therefore, will infringe upon the sovereignty of one, two, or all 
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three of these countries. For all intents and purposes, this means that any 
American anti-piracy campaign would have to be coordinated with these 
three states (and most likely also with the Philippines) or face the risk of 
precipitating serious diplomatic and perhaps even military confronta-
tions. This is true for Malaysia and Indonesia. Although Malaysia and 
Indonesia lack the resources to effectively respond to piracy on their own 
accord, they are unlikely to acquiesce in or support American military 
action in the Malacca Straits.32 According to Sheldon Simon, "there is 
considerable sensitivity, particularly in Indonesia and Malaysia, that 
overt assistance for the U.S. war on terrorism can be used by Islamic 
groups and political parties to undermine the governments in Jakarta and 
Kuala Lumpur."33
This sensitivity to overt U.S. involvement in the Straits of Malacca became 
exceedingly clear in 2004, when the U.S. sought to launch an initiative to 
increase maritime security in the region by way of the Regional Maritime 
Security Initiative (RMSI). The initiative strove to appear benign and 
non-invasive, ostensibly aiming to develop "a partnership of willing 
regional nations with varying capabilities and capacities to identify, mon-
itor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under existing interna-
tional and domestic laws."34 Despite its understated tone, the RMSI was 
not welcomed in the region—especially because it was accompanied by 
suggestions that American naval forces could be deployed in the Straits to 
protect shipping. Neither Malaysia nor Indonesia was willing to support 
or even consider such deployments, and the mere suggestion of direct 
American action in the Straits ignited a great deal of protest. In fact, the 
protests were so vehement that U.S. policymakers quickly dropped RMSI 
from their lexicon, although they continued to pursue various aspects of 
the program in relative anonymity. Indeed, a 2006 pledge by Admiral 
William Fallon to help Malaysia and Indonesia fight piracy specifically 
excluded the possibility of U.S. naval forces operating in their territorial 
waters.35
While the RMSI died an early and ignominious death, it does ultimately 
appear to have had some positive externalities. In particular, the implied 
threat that the U.S. would ultimately resort to unilateral action against 
piracy in the region seems to have spurred Indonesia and Malaysia into 
action. In July of 2004, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore launched 
coordinated maritime patrols, code-named MALSINDO patrols, to 
address the problem of crime in the Malacca Straits. In contrast to previ-
ous bilateral arrangements, the MALSINDO patrols were to be year-
round, rather than ad hoc, patrols.36
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In addition to joint maritime patrols, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia 
also initiated joint aerial patrols over the Straits. Finally, regional states 
have also undertaken efforts to increase their naval capabilities. In early 
2004, the Malaysian government established the Malaysian Maritime 
Enforcement Agency, an organization similar to the U.S. Coast Guard, 
with responsibility for patrolling the Malaysian maritime zone.37 The 
organization operates some forty vessels, mostly small patrol boats, and 
takes responsibility for a significant portion of the Malacca Straits. The 
Royal Malaysian Navy has also added several patrol vessels and mine 
warfare units in the last few years.
As pirate activity in the Straits peaked, the Thai Navy became involved in 
maritime police operations. The budget of the Royal Thai Navy has 
expanded since 2000, largely in response to concerns about piracy.38 The 
acquisition of a former Spanish aircraft carrier was publicly justified as an 
anti-piracy step.39 While the size of the Royal Thai Navy has not substan-
tially grown, increased funding has allowed a greater tempo of operations 
and longer anti-piracy deployments.
In 2002, the Republic of Singapore Navy ordered its first locally-built 
Formidable-class frigate. The lead ship of a class of six (four of which 
have been delivered), Formidable has been called "by far the most 
advanced surface combatant in East Asia."40 The acquisition of these frig-
ates has been accompanied by the modernization of the rest of 
Singapore's Navy, including its air arm. Finally, in early 2005, Indonesia 
announced plans for an expansion of its Navy by the addition of 60 patrol 
vessels, which would represent a 50 percent increase in the size of the 
fleet.41 These plans included an expansion of Indonesian maritime air 
patrol capability. Indonesia has also initiated programs to check the 
"demand" side of piracy, by trying to dissuade individuals and communi-
ties from supporting piratical activities.42 Together these regional and 
unilateral efforts seemingly have helped reduce the incidence of piratical 
activities in the Straits of Malacca. While weaknesses remain—especially 
due to distrust among the regional actors and the lack of resources to 
maintain a high level of vigilance and operations against pirates—the situ-
ation seems to have improved, as can be seen from the drop in piratical 
activity in the region. One key component of this has been the more low-
key role that the U.S. has played in the process. Rather than take the pub-
lic lead in the fight against piracy in the region, something that was clearly 
unwelcome given the responses to the RMSI, the U.S. has played an active 
role in trying to bolster the capabilities of the regional states to maintain 
their operational readiness as it pertains to resolving the piracy issue.
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Not surprisingly, U.S. efforts since 2004 have focused on 
Indonesia. As part of a major program aimed at helping 
Indonesia obtain a clearer picture of vessel movements in territo-
rial waters, the United States has agreed to supply twelve coastal 
radar facilities worth $50 million; five on the Indonesian side of 
the SOM and seven in the Makassar Strait. The U.S. government 
has also promised to donate a total of 30 25-foot long Defender-
class patrol boats to the Indonesian marine police, the first 15 of 
which were delivered in January 2008… U.S. support for 
Indonesia in this area has been without fanfare, principally 
because of the domestic sensitivities associated with receiving 
security aid from the United States.43
Finally, the U.S. has not only contributed to building capabilities of the 
regional actors to deal with piracy, it has also tried to increase communi-
cation and coordination among these states. Beginning in 2000, the U.S. 
military's Pacific Command (PACOM) began pursuing a series of initia-
tives designed to facilitate cooperation between the states of the Pacific 
Rim. Apparently influenced by the writings of Karl Deutsch, PACOM chief 
Admiral Dennis Blair sought to create an Asian "security community" 
using the influence of his Command. In 2000, PACOM introduced APAN, 
the Asia Pacific Area Network. APAN is an internet network designed to 
increase transparency and information sharing between states and civil-
ian organizations. PACOM also initiated MPAT (Multinational Planning 
Augmentation Team) workshops, which brought together officers from 
various regional military organizations in order to help facilitate team-
work and multilateral planning. MPAT is a loose coordinating body that 
allows the militaries of its member states to coordinate action, to conduct 
joint planning efforts, and to become familiar with one another with 
regards to common security threats, of which piracy is only one.44
In sum, maritime piracy in the Straits of Malacca appears to have declined 
in recent years due to the combination of factors, in addition to an 
improvement of the economic environment, which is widely considered to 
be the root cause of piracy in the region. First, U.S. interest in, and facili-
tation of, communication between regional states has aided and abetted a 
process of regional institutional cooperation. Second, the implicit threat 
of U.S. (and Japanese) intervention spurred regional actors not only to 
take unilateral action, but also gave them an incentive to pursue multilat-
eral approaches. Third, the United States has invested, and continues to 
invest, resources to increase the capabilities of regional states to fight 
maritime piracy. This support allows the U.S. to support the suppression 
of piracy, while reducing its direct involvement and the potentially 
adverse political ramifications associated with it. Given the recent surge 
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in piratical activity off the coast of East Africa, and the successful anti-
piracy campaign in the Straits of Malacca, the question arises whether the 
blueprint for reducing piracy in Southeast Asia can be successfully repli-
cated in Africa. In the next section we examine this question.
Prospects for the Horn of Africa
Whereas the number of reported acts of piracy has dropped in the past 
two years in Southeast Asia, the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) has reported a significant increase in piracy off the coast of Africa. 
More specifically, based upon the records kept by the IMO, the number of 
piratical incidents off the coast of East Africa has been on the rise since 
2004, with a brief dip in 2006. Piracy off the Horn of Africa has typically 
involved attacks from small, fast boats against foreign fishing, recreation, 
and cargo vessels (some carrying food aid to Somalia).45 Recently, activity 
against oil tankers has increased.46 The attackers have focused on targets 
that can provide a significant ransom, and have taken care to seize and 
preserve hostages, both to deter possible rescue operations as well as to 
facilitate ransom payments.47 A French commando raid against a group 
of pirates who had seized a French yacht proved the exception, rather 
than the rule; most states have paid the ransoms that the pirates 
demand.48 As of September 11, 2008, over 150 sailors and other crew 
members were being held hostage by Somali pirates.49
Since the International Maritime Bureau has recommended that shipping 
avoid the Somali coast by 200 miles (a move that adds two to three days 
to most voyages), Somali pirates have begun to operate small boats from 
"mother ships" well outside territorial waters.50 Attacks off Somalia and 
in the Gulf of Aden are resulting in significant economic costs. Insurance 
rates for vessels moving through the Gulf of Aden have jumped 1,000 per-
cent.51 Kidnapping settlements are now moving into the seven-figure 
range.52 One naval analyst estimates the total insurance cost alone at over 
$160 million a year, to say nothing of the ransom demands, lost cargoes, 
damaged vessels, and lost productivity.53 Perhaps most troubling, the 
ransom demands may be funding insurgent and terrorist activities within 
Somalia, and thus serving to further destabilize the state and the region.54 
These concerns were heightened when Somali Islamists seized the port of 
Kismayu in late August of 2008.55
The reasons for the rise in piracy in this region are easy to identify. The 
breakdown of governmental authority in Somalia, ongoing economic 
woes, and the ready availability of small arms have clearly created an 
environment conducive to maritime lawlessness and provided an incen-
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tive for individuals and groups to engage in piratical activities. Somalia 
has been in turmoil since the collapse of the Somali central government in 
1991, which plunged the country into civil war. Warlords replaced govern-
ment authority, and international intervention between 1993 and 1995 
failed to restore order. In 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), an alli-
ance of several warlord groups with an Islamic militia, succeeded in 
imposing order over a substantial portion of southern Somalia. In late 
2006, however, a U.S.-backed Ethiopian invasion of Somalia drove the 
ICU from power, replacing it with a transitional government consisting 
largely of warlords with no particular allegiance to a central state author-
ity. Since that time the new government has failed to establish order in 
the capital city of Mogadishu, as well as the surrounding countryside. 
Unfortunately, the chaos that has followed the U.S.-supported Ethiopian 
invasion of Somalia has reversed the gains made by the ICU in restoring 
order and reducing piracy.
In addition to providing a safe harbor for pirates, who do not need to fear 
governmental sanctions, the lack of a Somali state makes cooperation 
between sea and shore difficult, and complicates intelligence gathering 
efforts. There is little reason to believe, therefore, that the problem of 
piracy will be resolved through law enforcement on the part of the Somali 
state, or through a diminution of the structural economic incentives for 
piracy. The economic situation in Somalia, which appears to be one of the 
chief driving forces behind the surge in piratical activity, does not seem to 
be improving. Like in Southeast Asia, therefore, the impetus for the sup-
pression of piracy will likely have to come from external powers. This is 
also true because of the lack of established cooperative regional institu-
tions.
In contrast to Southeast Asia, East Africa lacks a well-developed regional 
organization such as ASEAN, which when combined with material and 
political support of the United States could form the institutional basis for 
a concerted and multilateral regional anti-piracy campaign.56 Since the 
fall of the Islamic Courts Union, the African Union has taken on an 
increasingly significant role in keeping the Somali peace, acting as guar-
antors of one of the factions in the ongoing Somali civil war. Compared to 
the security institutions of Southeast Asia, however, the African Union 
does not exhibit the characteristics of a mature security community, nor 
does it have a significant capacity to call on the military capabilities of its 
member states for collaborative action.57 The lack of an African capability 
to respond to piratical activity is reflective both of the relative poverty of 
the continent and, thus far, of a lack of regional consensus on borders and 
priorities. The Horn of Africa region in particular has seen several wars in 
the last twenty years. As such, the prospects for bilateral and multilateral 
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cooperation are much grimmer in Africa than in Southeast Asia. This is 
problematic for two reasons. First, suspicion between states prevents 
direct communication and collaboration on active anti-piracy efforts. Sec-
ond, an increased tempo of anti-piracy operations from any one state can 
appear threatening to other states, especially in the absence of good com-
munication.
However, even the presence of close regional ties and cooperative institu-
tions would likely not produce an effective anti-piracy regime in the 
region. The states in the region simply lack the basic naval capabilities to 
act decisively against pirates. Unfortunately, the density of local naval 
forces in the Horn of Africa region is substantially lower than that in the 
Malacca Straits area. Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti have no navies to 
speak of. Saudi Arabia possesses the largest navy in the region, but Saudi 
attention focuses on the Persian Gulf, rather than the Gulf of Aden or the 
Horn of Africa. Israeli and Egyptian naval forces typically do not leave the 
Red Sea. As the Economist notes:
East Africa does not have a single warship in good shape. 
Tanzania's navy chief, Brigadier Said Omar, says that his fleet 
never reaches the high seas; its operational range is 20 nautical 
miles. When asked to describe his ships he laughs sadly. "Ships? 
We don't have ships. We have very old, very small boats." Peter 
Kivuyo, Tanzania's police marine chief, says his force might reach 
five nautical miles offshore "if the waves are small." His men do 
not even have binoculars. After President George Bush visited 
Tanzania earlier this year, some hints were dropped—so far to no 
avail—that some high-speed interceptor boats might come in 
handy.58
Indeed, other than South Africa, no sub-Saharan African state possesses 
combat vessels of note. This situation contrasts sharply with that of 
Southeast Asia, which enjoys a comparatively high density of naval force 
and has seen an increase in force capability over the last five years. To the 
extent that naval force prevents piracy, therefore, the solution for the 
Horn of Africa must lie with naval forces outside Africa.
Given these conditions, it is difficult to imagine how the United States, at 
this present time, could successfully reprise its role as an external facilita-
tor of a successful regional counter-piracy campaign in the Horn of Africa. 
The basic institutional and material conditions which allowed it to suc-
cessfully support both regional and unilateral counter-piracy efforts in the 
Straits of Malacca without getting directly involved simply do not exist in 
the Horn of Africa. In addition to efforts to alleviate the social and eco-
Farley, Ph.D. and Gortzak: Fighting Piracy: Experiences in Southeast Asia and off the Horn o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009Journal of Strategic Security
14
nomic conditions that provide incentives for the local population to resort 
to piracy as a means to subsist, direct outside intervention is needed to 
deal with the immediate and most obvious manifestations of the problem 
of piracy in the area. There are, however, two possible solutions to this 
problem, one short term and one long term.
First, the U.S. can use its position in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) to lead and facilitate a multilateral naval campaign 
against piracy in the seas of East Africa. Members of the NATO alliance, 
including the United States, enjoy the most substantial naval capabilities 
of any region in the world. Moreover, NATO vessels already regularly 
deploy to East Africa and the Gulf of Aden. Spanish, Dutch, Canadian, 
German, French, and American ships have all confronted Somali-based 
pirates in the last year.59 However, the primary vehicle for Western naval 
presence in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden area, known as Combined 
Task Force-150 (CTF-150), is currently not up to the task of undertaking 
an extensive counter-piracy campaign. The force normally includes about 
fifteen vessels and has been tasked with patrolling the approaches to the 
Persian Gulf.60 Since early 2006, CTF-150 has taken on a direct role in 
preventing piracy and maritime terrorism off Somalia and in the Gulf of 
Aden, and most of the foreign warships that have encountered pirates 
have in fact been part of CTF-150.61 According to Combined Maritime 
Forces Commander Vice Admiral Bill Gortney, however, CTF-150 lacks 
the capabilities to control piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of 
Aden.62 Indeed, the dozen or so ships that typically constitute CTF-150 
make up only a small fraction of the naval forces available in the Straits of 
Malacca. A deployment similar in scale to Operation Active Endeavour, a 
NATO-sponsored project involving Mediterranean navies, might have an 
effect.63 Indeed, NATO recently decided to deploy seven frigates to the 
Horn of Africa to conduct anti-piracy operations, although it is unclear 
how long the ships will remain.64 Even such an operation, however, 
would provide only a temporary fix to the problem.
NATO and other non-local forces also face legal difficulties in the appre-
hension of Somali pirates. These difficulties have produced different 
responses in different navies. The Danish Navy returned ten captured 
pirates to Somali territory, where no legal authority could hold them 
accountable.65 The United States has detained suspected pirates in off-
shore vessels, and has received criticism for doing so from international 
human rights groups.66 The French Navy has brought pirates captured in 
commando raids to France for prosecution, but the outcome of these 
prosecutions is as yet undetermined.67 The Royal Navy has expressed 
reluctance to capture pirates, which obviously hampers anti-piracy 
efforts.68 Legal analysis suggests that states have the right to prosecute 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 2  No. 1
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss1/1
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.1.1Fighting Piracy: Experiences in Southeast Asia and off the Horn of Africa
15
captured pirates, but the will for such prosecution may be lacking.69 At a 
minimum, any concerted anti-piracy effort requires a common approach 
to the legal treatment of apprehended pirates.
The reorganization of the United States' regional Combatant Commands 
may facilitate the emergence of such a long-term solution. The United 
States decided in 2008 to carve a new African Command (AFRICOM) out 
of three existing Combatant Commands.70 As the name implies, 
AFRICOM will have special responsibility for military planning on the 
African continent, which will presumably include offshore areas of 
Somalia and Nigeria. Simply removing Somalia from the overcommitted 
Central Command will allow devotion of greater attention to the problem. 
As the Combatant Commands have both military and non-military assets 
with which to influence regional states, the prospect for some increase in 
local anti-piracy efforts appears bright. AFRICOM cannot force local 
states to do anything they don't want to do, but it can influence them 
through military-to-military contacts and through promises and actual 
provision of military assistance. Greater U.S. interest in the area can also 
alleviate security dilemma dynamics and improve cooperation, just as it 
has in Southeast Asia.
Conclusions
We have argued that four major factors contributed to the reduction of 
piracy in the Malacca Straits region: U.S. hegemonic interest, existing and 
emergent international institutions, decent bilateral relations among 
regional actors, and density of naval forces. U.S. interest and capability 
helped to facilitate cooperation between regional states in order to fight 
piracy. In particular, the fear of unilateral American intervention was 
among the catalysts for regional cooperation between Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. This cooperation was further facilitated by the 
presence of robust, long-standing international institutions that included 
and gave voice to the relevant regional players, while new cooperative 
structures emerged over time under American tutelage. Finally, sup-
ported by the United States, the states of Southeast Asia developed suffi-
cient naval capabilities to patrol areas of high piratical activity, and 
enjoyed sufficiently benign bilateral relations to avoid the precipitation of 
security dilemma dynamics. These factors have combined to allow the 
states in the region to significantly reduce the incidence of piracy in the 
Straits of Malacca, and across Southeast Asia.
An analysis of these same factors indicates that short term prospects for 
the reduction of piracy around the Horn of Africa remain grim. While the 
Farley, Ph.D. and Gortzak: Fighting Piracy: Experiences in Southeast Asia and off the Horn o
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009Journal of Strategic Security
16
United States and other major powers have an interest in reducing pirati-
cal activity off the Horn of Africa, the other conditions do not hold. Inter-
national institutions, which limit inter-state competition and facilitate 
cooperation, are much more robust in Southeast Asia than in Africa. The 
primary security institution for the Horn of Africa, the African Union, has 
failed to prevent competition and conflict between its members in the 
region, and has also failed to bring order to Somalia, leaving pirates with a 
safe haven. The Arab League lacks the institutional writ to challenge 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and also suffers from problems of internal 
competition and conflict. Finally, the density of naval force in Southeast 
Asia is extremely high compared to the Horn of Africa. Including only 
those states immediately adjacent to the problem areas, the navies of 
Southeast Asia possess over 60 modern major naval units, and over 150 
patrol vessels, along with numerous helicopters and other patrol aircraft. 
African navies possess no modern naval units and only a handful of air-
craft and patrol ships.
What might change this forecast? An increase in African naval capability 
would help, but given the poverty of the states in question and the bureau-
cratic and technological capability necessary to operating a modern navy, 
quick progress in this area is unlikely. The transfer of patrol ships to local 
navies would increase capability somewhat, but modern vessels require 
infrastructure to operate and keep in service. As for international institu-
tions, the capability of the African Union depends largely on the capability 
of its members, both in terms of conflict cooperation (the ability to "get 
along") and in terms of material strength. Although the African Union has 
taken important strides in the security arena, the road to a robust organi-
zation capable of dealing with piracy will be long.
On the upside, the United States and the European Union have expressed 
a clear interest in reducing the incidence of piracy off the Horn of Africa. 
In part because European ships often fall prey to pirate attacks, a number 
of European navies have deployed ships to the area in an effort to ward off 
pirates. The European Union itself could become involved; it is possible to 
interpret French aggressiveness in the fight against piracy as a message in 
favor of an independent EU military capability. Non-European navies 
have become involved as well. In response to the seizure of two Malaysian 
tankers, three Royal Malaysian Navy warships have deployed to the Gulf 
of Aden.71 The deployment of naval forces by the United States and the 
nations of the EU can ease some of the problems created by a lack of local 
naval capacity. Similarly, the U.S. and the nations of Europe have power-
ful and robust international institutions that can prevent competition and 
create a collaborative environment. Non-European states may also have 
an incentive to participate; the presence of Chinese fishing boats off the 
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coast of East Africa has led China to cooperate in anti-piracy intelligence 
gathering with France.72 Still, the long term deployment of naval forces to 
the Horn of Africa in density similar to that of the Southeast Asia states 
would tax the capabilities of even the largest European navies. Moreover, 
because of the difficulties presented by the lack of state institutions in 
Somalia, and of terrorist threat and other political problems in Yemen 
and Oman, the availability of suitable naval bases is limited. Legal restric-
tions on the pursuit of pirates in international and Somali waters also take 
their toll; Germany, for example, has been unable to decide the restraints 
under which the German Navy will operate in anti-piracy operations.73
Private, market-based solutions to the piracy problem have also been 
floated. In June 2008, France facilitated the signing of a contract between 
the rump Somali government and the private security company Secopex, 
with the goal of providing a force that could fight pirates.74 Blackwater, 
perhaps the best known private security provider, unveiled a maritime 
subsidiary earlier this year.75 Claude Berube of the United States Naval 
Academy has also promoted the idea of using private security companies 
to support the "1,000 Ship Navy."76 The idea of arming merchant ships 
has also returned, although this presents practical problems and runs at 
odds with maritime tradition.77 To some degree, the role of the market 
and of the involvement of private security organizations rests on a philo-
sophical question: what role ought the state play in the facilitation of 
trade? That the state (and, by extension, international institutions) 
should play a positive role in the facilitation of trade has been the most 
common answer, but certainly anti-piracy activity will involve some com-
bination of private and public action.
The lack of an organized Somali state remains a problem. As long as 
pirates can seek safe harbor (literal, if not legal) along the Somali coast, 
anti-piracy forces will face difficulty deterring attacks. The lack of an 
established, unified Somali state also makes it difficult to taken any multi-
lateral legal action to prevent the paying of ransoms, as the area has no 
financial monitoring infrastructure worth noting. Rebuilding a Somali 
state (or Somali successor states) will likely have a positive effect on 
piracy rates; troops from the semi-autonomous Puntland region of 
Somalia recently attempted to liberate a pirate-controlled vessel.78
Concerted multi-lateral action helped to reduce rates of piracy in South-
east Asia. However, the Horn of Africa lacks the necessary elements for a 
successful anti-piracy campaign. Either the international community will 
need to substantially step up its efforts, or new and innovative solutions to 
the problem (such as private military companies) will need to be found.
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